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THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES.

CHAPTER I.

A warranty in a sale of personal property is

a

statement or representation made by the seller contemporaneously with, and as part of, the contract of sale, though collateral to the express object of it, having reference to the
character or quality or the title to the goods or article
sold, and by which he promises or undertakes that certain
facts are or shall be as he represents them.
The warranty is of two kinds, the express and the
implied warranty.
The warranty is express when created by the apt and
explicit statements of the seller;

it is implied when the law

derives it from implication or inference from the nature of
transaction or the relative situation or circumstances of the
parties.
The warranty is not an essential of a contract of
sale, though it is a usual accompaniment.

A sale may be com-

plete although there be no warranties and the warranty, when
it exists, is therefore a mere collateral undertaking, though
it forms no part of the contract.
In England the terms warranty and condition are
used interchangeably, but in this country they are clearly
distinguishable.

The distinction is well settled in this

country that, in a breach of condition in an executory contract, the vendee has the right to reject the property tendered and bring an action for breach of the contract, or he
must notify the vendor that he does not accept the property,
and that it is held subject to the vendor's orders.
On the other hand, a breach of warranty affords
grounds only for an action for damages and in but one instance
can the article tendered be rejected.

That is in a sale of

an article of a particular description.
Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y. 358.
Now having clearly in mind what we mean by warranty
in connection with the contract of sale I intend, as is shown
by the title, to deal only with the implied warranty.

CHAPTER II.

The implied warranty is a collateral contract which
the law infers and raises from the transaction the relative
situation, or circumstances of the parties.
Implied warranties may be classified, first,-

Im-

plied Warranty of Title, and, second,- Implied Warranty of
Quality.
The implied warranty of title is a well known doctrine and has been a most important factor in the law of sales.
It can be laid down as a general rule, both under the common
law and modern decisions, that possession of personal property implies title, and in every case of sale of personal property in possession there is an implied warranty of title in
the vendor.
2 Blackstone 451.
Burt v. Dewey, 40 N. Y. 283.
O'Brien v.Jones, 91 N. Y. 197.
Marshall v. Duke, 51 Ind. 62.
Morris v. Thompson, 85 Ill. 16.
Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29 - 45.
Gross v. Kierski, 41 Cal. 111.
Peoples Bank v. Kentz, 99 Pa. St. 344.
This seems to be an exceedingly just doctrine since,
if the vendor who deals with the property as his own and under such circumstances sells them and there be no implication
of law that he warrants his title, it would work great hard-

ship and fraud upon the vendee who is in no way chargeable
with negligence.

The purpose of the law is surely great

protection to the vendee.
In the early English law, it seems that the courts
did not recognize this doctrine of implied warranty of title
to personal property any more than to realty, the doctrine of
caveat emptor applying without limitation to the title to
both species

of property.

Parke, B. has explained why this was so.

He says,

"in early days the question of implied warranty of title did
not enter men's minds because the sales were commonly made
in market overt where the title obtained by the buyer was
good against anybody but the sovereign."
Benj. on Sales, Sec. 636.
In 1849, Parke, B., first recognized the doctrine
as existing in England.

In Morley v. Attenborough, (3 Exch.

500), he says, "We do not suppose that there would be any
doubt, if the articles are bought in a shop professedly carried on for the sale of goods, that the shopkeeper must be
considered as warranting that those who purchase will have a
good title to the goods purchased.

In such a case the vendor

sells as his own and that is equivalent to a warranty of title."
This case, however, turned on another point.

The

doctrine was next recognized and a rule laid down by Erle,
C. J., in Eichholz v. Bannister, (17 C. B. N. S. 708).
That was an action brought by the plaintiff to re-

cover back the purchase money paid to defendant for goods
which were subsequently claimed by the true owner from whom
they had been stolen.

Erle, C. J. says, "But in almost all

the transactions of sale in common life, the seller by his
very act of selling holds out to the buyer that he is the
owner of the article he offers for sale.

The sale of a chat-

tel is the strongest act of dominion that is incidental to
ownership.

A purchaser under ordinary circumstances would

naturally be led to the conclusion that, by offering an article for sale, the seller affirms that he has title to sell,
and that the buyer may enjoy that for which he parts with his
money."
The rule is followed in the following cases:
Rapheal v. Burt, Cab. & Ellis 325.
Page v. Cowasjee Edulizee, L. R. I P. C. 127-144.
Bagulley v. Hawley, L. R. 2 C. P. 625.
There seems to be a general rule in this country
that in order to have the implied warranty of title, the vendor must have been in actual possession.

If the vendor is

not in actual possession at the time of the sale the rule of
caveat emptor applies.
This doctrine was first laid down in New York in
McCoy v. Artcher, (3 Barb. 323), where after a careful examination of the decisions at that time, the court came to the
conclusion that if the property sold was, at the time of the
Sale, in the possession of a third person and there was no
affirmation of title, warranty of title would hot be implied.

This doctrine has become fixed in New York and is
followed in the other states.
In Byrnside v. Burdeet, (15 W. Va. 718), Haymond,
J.

says, "And in such a case the vendor is to be held to an

implied warranty though nothing be said on the subject between the parties.

But if the property sold, be at the time

of the sale in the possession of a third person, and there be
no affirmation or assertion of ownership, no warranty of
title will be implied."
In Huntington v. Hall,

(36 Me. 501),

the court held

that plaintiff was not entitled to recover back the consideration paid for defendant's house upon the land of a third person.

The court holding strictly to the above rule, held that

since the defendant was not in possession, there was no warranty of title implied and plaintiff was properly nonsuited.
In Gross v. Kierski, (41 Cal. 111), Wallace, J.
says, "The fact of the goods being out of the possession of
the vendor may be considered to put the vendee upon his guard,
and it is his own folly if, under the circumstances, he will
not protect himself by exacting an express agreement to warrant the title.

The doctrine of caveat emptor applies in

this case."
The same rule is laid down in Scranton v. Clark,
(39 N. Y. 220), and in England in Medina v. Sloughton, (I
Salk. 219 and Oro. Jac. 197).
The general rule, however, must be qualified and
under certain circumstances

the courts have seen fit

to draw

the case from the application of the rule.
The Massachusetts courts have limited the doctrine
and hold that whenever the vendor has constructive possession,
as in the case where the property is in the hands of a bailee,
there no warranty of title is implied.
Shattuck v. Green, 104 Mass. 42 - 45.
Other states have limited the doctrine so that
where the sale is made by a sheriff or an officer of the
court, no warranty of title is implied.
Sheppard v. Earles, 13 Hun. 653.
Slowin v. Smith, 43 Mass. 497.
Neal v. Gellaspy, 56 Ind. 451.
The Monte Allegre Tenant, 9 Wheat. 616.
Harrison v. Shanks, 13 Bush. 620.
Whenever there is an assertion of ownership or an
affirmation of title by the vendor this will amount to a
warranty, and this is so even though the possession of the
property in question be in some third person.

The assertions

or affirmations would take the case from the rules relative
to implied warranty of title and would be more properly discussed under the subject of express warranty.

CHAPTER III.

The maxim of the common law, caveat emptor, (Let
the buyer beware), is the general rule applicable to sales as
far as the quality of the article sold is concerned.

The

buyer, in the absence of fraud, purchases at his own risk unless the seller has given an express warranty or unless a
warranty can be implied from the nature and circumstances of
the sale.
The rule of caveat emptor is founded upon the idea
that the purchaser sees what he buys and the tendency of modern decisions is to imply a warranty of quality in all cases
where the purchaser has no opportunity to exercise his own
judgment, but relies on the judgment of the party with whom
he deals.
So far as an ascertained specific chattel already
in existence, and which the buyer has inspected, is concerned, the rule of caveat emptor admits of no exception by implied warranty of quality.
If the buyer has exercised his right of inspection
and fails to make a complete examination of the subject of
sale, he is nevertheless bound by the rule of caveat emptor
as to that part which he has neglected to inspect.
Barnard v. Kellogg, (10 Wall. 388) is a good illustration of this principle.

There the buyer inspected cer-

tain of the bales and neglected to examine the whole lot.
The court held that as to the damage in

the bales the rule of

caveat emptor applied.
In a similar case, Salisbury v. Stainer, (19 Wend.
158),

the interior of the bales

was

inferior to the exterior;

Bronson, J., "when the purchaser has an opportunity to inspect the goodsin the absence of fraud, the seller is not
answerable for latent defects and the rule of caveat emptor
applies."
In Carson v. Baillee, (19 Pa. St. 380), Lowrie, J.
says, "Where goods are sold on inspection there is no standard but identity and no warranty implied other than that the
identical goods sold and no otiers shall be delivered;" and
"The name given them in the bill of sale is then immaterial
because faith was placed, not in the name, but in the quality
and kind discovered on inspection.

If there be any fraud,

concealment, or misrepresentation, the case is altered and
for this the party can have remedies upon other principles."
In Lord v. Grow, (39 Pa. 88), there was a sale of
sumer wheat which proved to be winter wheat, and plaintiff
lost the whole crop.

The court held that there was no im-

plied warranty of quality, the buyer having inspected, notwithstanding that the difference could not be determined by
inspection.
This case is rather severe but it is explained that
here the purchaser's knowledge was as great as the vendor's
upon inspection of the article.
There are, however, several implied warranties in
the sale of chattels recognized by law; first,- In the sale

of a chattel by description, there is an implied warranty
that the goods delivered are of that description and are
merchantable; second,- In a sale by sample, there is an implied warranty that the quality of the bulk is equal
of the sample; third,-

to that

In the sale of a chattel manufactured

or produced for a particular purpose, there is an implied
warranty that the chattel will answer the purpose; fourth,In the transfer of a negotiable instrument, there is an implied warranty of the competency of the parties to the instrument and that the signatures are genuine.
I shall now deal with each sub-division more in
tail.

de-

First,- In the bargain and sale of a chattel of a

particular description there is an implied warranty that the
goods sold are of that description.

This doctrine is sustain-

ed by a great weight of judicial authority both in England
and America.

The question was first raised in England in

Chandler v. Lopas, (Cro. Jac. 4), which held that there was
no implied warranty in a sale by description.

This case has,

however, been over-ruled.
In New York the question came up in SWett v. Colgate,

(20 Johns. 196), and the court followed the doctrine

laid down in Chandler v. Lopus, supra.

This case has also

been over-ruled and the doctrine first mentioned was declared
and has ever since been recognized as the true rule in this
state.
The question came before the court in Hawkins v.
Pemberton, (51 N. Y. 198).

The action was for damages for

non-acceptance of certain vitrol sold as blue vitrol when in
fact it was but Salzburger Vitrol, a much inferior article.
The court held that the defendants were justified in refusing
to accept the goods and that the description given by the
auctioneer, who sold the goods to defendants, was in fact a
warranty that the goods were of that description.
In White v. Miller, (71 N. Y. 118),

there was a

sale of a partic1ar seed described in defendant's catalogue
as "Bristol Cabbage Seed".

The plaintiff's crops, produced

from the alleged "Bristol Cabbage Seed", proved that the seed
was not such as described, but an inferior cabbage seed and
wholly unfit for plaintiff's use.

Earl, J. says, "We think

the modern doctrine upon this subject is

reasonable,

and pro-

ceeds upon a just interpretation of a contract of sale.

A

dealer who sells an article, describing it by the name of an
article of commerce, the identity of which is not known to
the purchaser, must understand that the latter relies upon
the description as represented by the seller, that it is the
thing described and this constitutes a warranty."
The rule is laid down in the following cases:
Van Wyck v. Allen, 69 N. Y. 61.
Passenger v. Throburn, 34 N. Y. 634.
Lewis v. Rountree, 78 N. C. 323.
Darley v. Green, 15 Pa. St. 118.
Brantley v. Thomas, 22 Tex. 270.
In a sale of goods by description when the buyer
has not inspected the goods, there is in addition to the war-

ranty ,

the condition precedent that the goods shall answer

the description, and in a sale by sample an implied warranty
that the goods shall be saleable and merchantable.

This doc-

trine is well known to the law and is sufficiently illustrated by the following cases:
Howard v.

Hoey,

29 Wend.

Newberry v. Wall, 29 Sup.
Affirmed in

350.
Ct.

(N.

Y.)

106.

65 N. Y. 484.

Brunley v. Thomas, 22 Texas 271.
Merriam v. Field, 24 Wis. 640.
Murchie v. Cornell, 155 Mass.
Second,-

60.

In a sale by sample there is an implied

warranty that the quality of the bulk is equal to that of the
sample.

This is a general rule recognized both in England

and America, except in Pennsylvania where certain modifications are made.
To constitute a sale by sample it must appear that
the parties contracted wholly in reference to the samples
exhibited and that both mutually understood that they were
dealing with the sample with an understanding that the bulk
was like it.

The mere circumstance that the seller of the

goods exhibits a sample at the time of the sale will not of
itself make it a sale by sample so as to subject the seller
to the liability of an implied warranty.

To have the effect

there must be a mutual understanding between the parties.
The principal reason for this rule is laid down by
the courts to be that because there is no opportunity for a
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personal examination of the bulk of the commodity which the
sample is shown to represent.
The general rule is sufficiently illustrated by
Schuchardt v. Allen, (I Wall. 359 -

370).

action was for damages for false warranty.

In this case the
At the time of

the sale of certain Dutch Madder the defendants exhibited a
bottle of the same and upon its appearance in the bottle the
plaintiffs purchased a large amount.

The plaintiffs were not

allowed to examine the sample except by its appearance.

The

court held that there was an implied warranty that the quality of the madder sent would be equal to that in the bottle
exhibited as a sample and the parties so understood the sale.
It is further illustrated by Waring v. Mason, (18
Wend. 425).
ple.

In this case there was a sale of cotton by sam-

The bales delivered were packed in the interior with an

inferior cotton.

The Chancellor says, "A sale by sample does

not come within the principle of the common law that the purchaser must look out for himself, as every agreement to sell
by sample does, from its very nature, contain an implied, if
not an express warranty, that the bulk of the article sold
shall correspond with the said sample."
See also Hargous v. Stone, 5 N. Y. 85.
Ames v. Jones, 77 N. Y. 614.
Pennsylvania courts have seen fit to modify this
rule and disregard the great weight of authority by holding
that in a sale by sample, the vendor guarantees only that the
article to be delivered shall follow its kind and be merchant-

able.
Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Pa. St. 319.
West Republic Mining Co. v. Jones, 108 Pa. St.55
Third,- Where a manufacturer or dealer contracts to
supply an article which he manufactures or produces, or in
which he deals, to be applied to a particular purpose so that
the buyer necessarily trusts to the judgment or skill of the
manufacturer or dealer, there is an implied warranty that the
article shall be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it
is to be applied.

The liability is absolute because the spec-

ific purpose, rather than any specific article, is the essential matter of these contracts and the manufacturer or dealer
undertakes without qualification to fulfill that purpose substantially.
Bluett v. Osborne, 1 Stark 384.
The courts have, however, found some trouble in
laying down a uniform rule as to when latent defects in the
article sold will be such as to give the buyer an action for
the breach of this implied warranty.
The doctrine is well established that when there is
a latent defect in the article of which the manufacturer or
dealer is cognizant and he fails to call the attention of the
buyer to the defect, he is liable to the buyer for this defect.
The New York courts have held to the uniform rule
that a manufacturer is liable for any latent defect arising
from the manner of manufacture, but not for any latent defect
in materials which he is not show;rn and cannot be presumed to

have known.
This rule was laid down in Hoe v. Sanborn, (21 N.
Y. 552).

The action was brought upon a promissory note and

defended on the ground that the articles for which it was
given were defective.

The defect being latent, in that the

articles were of soft steel which rendered them wholly unfit
for defendant's use.

Selden, J. laid down the rule in this

language, "The vendor is liable, in such cases, for any latent defect, not disclosed to the purchaser, arising from the
manner in which the article was manufactured; and if he knowingly use improper materials he is liable for that also, but
not for any latent defect in the material which he is not
shown and cannot be presumed to have known."
This rule was extended somewhat in the case of
White v. Miller, (71 N. Y.

131), to include a defective man-

ner of cultivation.
In Ohio the courts have laid down a much broader
rule than New York.

They do not limit the implied warranty

to the manufactures but allow a recovery for defect in material furnished.
In Rodgers v. Niles, 11 Ohio 48, the plaintiff
brought an action for damages caused by a latent defect in
the construction of three boilers.

A divided court held

"under these circumstances, the defendants must be regarded
as having agreed to procure such materials and apply such
workmanship as would furnish to the plaintiff steam boilers
free from all defects, latent or otherwise, as would render
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them unfit for the ordinary uses contemplated by the contract."
The English courts have a doctrine which in effect
is the same as laid down by the Ohio courts.
Bright, (5 Bing. 533),

In Jones v.

the action was brought upon a breach

of implied warranty in the sale of copper by the maker thereof.

It was sold to be used and fit for said use in bottoming

a ship.

It proved to be defective and resulted in damage to

the plaintiffs.

The courts allowed a full recovery holding

the vendor to the absolute liability for latent defects.
This was followed by Randall v. Rawson, (2 Law Rep.
Q. B. Div. 102), where the plaintiff ordered and purchased of
the defendant, a coach builder, a pole for plaintiff's carriage.

The pole broke while in use and the horses became

frightened and were injured.

The plaintiff was allowed to

recover if the jury found that the damage was caused by the
latent defect in the pole.

This is surely equal to holding

the defendant liable for the latent defect in carriages sold
by him.
The rule in Hoe v. Sanborn, supra, has been followed in two important cases, White v. Miller, (71 N. Y. 118),
and Kellogg Bridge Co., v. Hamilton, (110 U.S. 108), where
the court in commenting upon Hoe v. Sanborn said it was a
"carefully considered case".
The same doctrine is followed in Bragg v. Morrill,
(45 Vt. 45).
ants.

Here there was a sale of a shaft by the defend-

The defendants were not, however, manufacturers of the

said shaft.

The court held that for any latent defect in the

shaft the defendant was not answerable.

This case practi-

cally over-rules Brown v. Sayles, (27 Vt. 227).
See also Leopold v. Van Kirk, 27 Wis. 152.
After a close examination of the authorities hereinbefore mentioned, a rule can be deduced to the effect that
where there is a sale of a definite existing chattel, specifically described, the actual condition of which can be ascertained by either party upon inspection, there is no implied warranty against the latent defects.
Fourth,- There is another implied warranty which
does not originate from the law of sales but has sprung from
the law merchant.

In the sale or transfer of a negotiable

instrument the transferor impliedly warrants that the signatures to the note are genuine and also that the parties thereto are competent to contract.
This is a well recognized doctrine and is sufficiently illustrated by the following cases:
Cabot Bank v. Merton, 4 Gray 156.
Terry v. Bissel, 36 Conn. 23.
Meriden Nat. Bank v. Galleudet, 120 N. Y. 298.

CHAPTER

IV.

It is now my intention to discuss the remedies
which the buyer has, or may have, against the vendor for breach
of any of the foregoing implied warranties.
First,- In this country it is very unsettled as to
what time the implied warranty of title may be considered
broken, so that an action for breach of warranty may be
brought.

Some of the authorities hold that the implied war-

ranty of title is broken by the existence of an outstanding
paramount title and that an action for the breach lies immediately and before there is an eviction of the vendee or any
disturbance of his possession.

Other authorities hold that

the warranty is not broken until the vendee has been disturbed in his possession by one having a paramount title.
The Massachusetts courts, Perkinson v.

Whelan, (116

Mass. 542), maintained that an action for breach of the implied warranty of title accrues at the time of the sale and
that the vendee is entitled to bring an action at any time
thereafter without any disturbance of the vendee's possession.
The mere existence of a paramount title is sufficient.
This rule has not been followed to any great extent.
The better doctrine seems to be that the right of action does
not accrue to the vendee until he has been disturbed in his
possession.
This rule has been followed in many of the states,
and possibly can be laid down as the general rule.

Gross v. Keirski, 41 Cal. 111.
Wanser v. Massler, 29 N. J. L. 256.
Burt v. Dewey, 40 N. Y. 283.
Krumbhaar v. Birch, 83 Pa. St. 426.
Linton v. Porter, 31 Ill. 107.
The remedies which the vendee may have for breach
of the implied warranty of quality can be enumerated as follows:
First,- He may, except in case of a specific chattel, refuse to accept the goods and return them or give notice that they are held subject to the vendor's orders and
risk.

If the vendee has paid the consideration he may bring

an action to recover back the same.
Pope v. Allis, 115 U. S. 363.
Second,- He may accept the goods and bring an action
for the breach of the warranty.

If he has not paid the con-

sideration he may set off or set up by way of counterclaim,
in the vendor's action for the price, the damages for breach
of warranty.
There is no apparent conflict of authorities in the
buyer's first remedy.

The authorities all agree that the

buyer can send the goods back and sue for breach of contract.
He must, however, return the goods as soon as he detects the
deficiency, or at least give notice of his intention not to
accept them.

The omission to do so within a reasonable time

debars him of his defense in an action for the purchase money.
Dbane v. Dunham, 79 Ill. 131.
Dailey v. Greene, 15 Pa. St. 118.

The courts are not all agreed upon the second proposition.

The great weight of authority,

however,

is

favor-

able to the proposition, and it can be said to be the general
rule.
The United States Courts in English v. Spokane Com.
Co., (57 Fed. 451), hold that "the great weight of authority,
as well as reason, is now, we think, well settled that in
cases of this kind, if the goods upon arrival at the place of
delivery are found to be unmerchantable in whole or in part,
the vendee has the option either to reject them or to receive
them and rely upon the warranty; and if

there be no waiver of

the right, he may bring an action against the vendor to recover damages for breach of the implied warranty, or set up a
counterclaim for such damages in an action brought by the
vendor for the purchase price of the goods."
Under the rule the vendee ought to notify the vendor of the defects.

The general rule is sufficiently illus-

trated by the following cases:Wolcott v. Mount, 36 N. J. L. 262.
Best v. Newton, 58 Vt. 543.
Lewis v. Rountree, 78 N. C. 323.
Hege v. Newson, 96 Ind. 431.
After a careful exmination of the authorities, one
must conclude that the New York Courts have drawn. away from
tie general rule and hold that in

an executor,, contract of

sale by description, after an inspection or an opportunity to
inspect, the acceptance of the goods is a bar to al

subse-

,7',ranty that

quent actions upon the breach of the implied
the goods answer the clescription.
In Reed v. Randall, (29 N. Y. 358),

there was a

sale of a crop of tobacco by the defendant to the plaintiff.
It appears that the tobacco was unrmerchantable, but this was
discovered upon inspection.

The plairtiffs nevertheless ac-

cepted the tobacco and subsequently brought this action for
damages.
is

Wright, J. says, "T7e latter (meaninC the vendee)

not bound to receive or pay for a thing that he has not

agreed to purchase, but if the thing purchased is found, on
examination, to be unsound, or not to answer the order given
for it, he must iJ:ueciately return it to the vendor, or give
him notice to take it back, and thereby rescind tlic contract
or he will be presiuried to have acquiesed in

the quality.

He

cannot accept the delivery of the property under the contract, and retain it, after an opportunity of ascertaining
its

quality or de-cription called for under the contract."
In Gaylord Mf:. Co.

v.

Allen,

(53 N. Y.

515),

the

rule is stated thus, "in the absence of fraud or latent defects,

an accentance

of the article

upon an ewecutory con-

tract after an opportunity to examine it,
agreement

that the quality is

to the contract,

and bars all

defects that may exist in
der such circumstances,

is a consent and

satiSfactory and as conforming
claim for compensation for any

the article.

The party cannot,

un-

retain the property and afterward sue

or counterclaim for dadiages,

under p'etense that

it

was not

of the character and quality or description called for by the

agre ement."
The rule has been uniformly followrod in,Gurney v.

58 11. Y. 358.

Co.,

KL.R.

Norton v. Dreyf'uss, 106 li.
v.

Iron, Co.

Cop.La-

Bleistein,

Y. 232.

108 1.

100 I . Y.

fIv.Foster,

Stu'3er v.

Pope,

Y. 90.

387.

115 i,. Y.

316.

The courts have, however, placed a sale b-' sample
<ithin the general rule, and in thaot case allow the action
ujon tlae Li±lied ,arrartu

after aucetaace, eveNL

though there

was an inspection or an o±<tortunity to inspect.
The rule is stated in Zabrish-ie -.

Central Vermont

P. R., (131 U. Y. 72),- "upon an executory sale of goods by
swiple, with warranty that goods shall correspond "itK

the

sample, t:;e vendee is not rrecluded from claiming and recovcring damages for breach of warranty, although he has acceptod the goods after fin op)ortunit- of inspection.
The follcwin,
g cases also su-p-port the rule:Kent v.

Friediar,

I01

T. Y. 616.

Brigg v. Tiltoi, 99 I. Y. 517.
-

Gurney v. Great T.estern, 58

.

Y. 358.

In all these cases, however, the courts have found
an express warranty from the transaction, and it is doubtful
whether the question squarely on implied warranty in sale by
sample has ever been raised.

The question has only been re-

viewed in cases where the warranty relative to the bulk could
not be ascertained otherise than by usage.

This then leaves

the court t

lay dovm

a rule tc govern the rigrht of action

after acceptance when the zale is band the deficiecIt

is

would hold witi
and Gaylord v.

sample,

can be discovered uon inspection.
tho writer's

opinion that the i Tew Yorl

the rule stated in
Allen,

supra,

Norton v.

ceptance.

Dreyfuss,

Courts
supra,

since the irew York Courts are

wont to construe that when the deficiency is
by inspection,

vitAout ,'rar:,a t;-

ascertainable

the implied warranty does not survive the ac-

CHAPTER V.

It is well settled that the measure of damages for
a breach of warranty as to the quality of the chattel sold is
the difference between the actual value of the article sold
at the time of the sale, and the value it
it

would have been,had

been as warranted.

}Iege v. Newson, 96 Ind. 431.
Case Plow Works,

63 N.

T. 1013.

Christ v. Jacoby, 10 Ind. App. 688.
Doulas v.

M[oses,

65 H. 7T.

(Iowa)

1004.

Some courts also include as damages the additional
trouble and expense whic> are the natural and proximate result of the breach of warranty.
Hodgman v. State R. R. Co., 45 11. App. 395.
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